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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2008 crisis was global and financial services were at its heart, revealing inadequacies 
including regulatory gaps, ineffective supervision, opaque markets and overly-complex 
products. The response has been international and coordinated through the G20 and the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB).  
 
The European Union has shown global leadership in implementing its G20 commitments. In 
line with EU's Roadmap for Financial Reform, the Union is very advanced in implementing 
the reforms linked to the G20 commitments. Most of the reforms are now going through the 
legislative process. In particular, a major achievement has been the recent adoption by the 
Council and the Parliament of landmark legislation on over-the-counter derivatives. 
Negotiations are also well developed on measures to revamp capital requirements for the 
banking sector. Overall, the reforms will equip the EU with the tools designed to ensure that 
the financial system, its institutions and markets are properly supervised. More stable and 
responsible financial markets are a pre-condition for growth and for the creation of a business 
environment that allows companies to thrive, innovate and expand their activities. This in turn 
enhances the confidence and trust of citizens. 
 
However, there is an increasing area of non-bank credit activity, or shadow banking, which 
has not been the prime focus of prudential regulation and supervision. Shadow banking 
performs important functions in the financial system. For example, it creates additional 
sources of funding and offers investors alternatives to bank deposits. But it can also pose 
potential threats to long-term financial stability.  
 
In response to the invitations by G20 in Seoul in 2010 and in Cannes in 2011, the FSB is 
therefore in the process of developing recommendations on the oversight and regulation of 
this activity.  
 
The FSB's work has highlighted that the disorderly failure of shadow bank entities can carry 
systemic risk, both directly and through their interconnectedness with the regular banking 
system. The FSB has also suggested that as long as such activities and entities remain subject 
to a lower level of regulation and supervision than the rest of the financial sector, reinforced 
banking regulation could drive a substantial part of banking activities beyond the boundaries 
of traditional banking and towards shadow banking. 
 
Against this background, the Commission considers it a priority to examine in detail the 
issues posed by shadow banking activities and entities. The objective is actively to respond 
and further contribute to the global debate; continue to increase the resilience of the Union’s 
financial system; and, ensure all financial activities are contributing to the economic growth. 
The purpose of this Green Paper is therefore to take stock of current development, and to 
present on-going reflections on the subject to allow for a wide-ranging consultation of 
stakeholders. 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
At the November 2010 Seoul Summit, the G20 Leaders identified some remaining issues of 
financial sector regulation that warranted attention. They highlighted “strengthening 
 3 
 
regulation and supervision of shadow banking” as one of these issues and requested that the 
FSB, in collaboration with other international standard setting bodies, develop 
recommendations to strengthen the oversight and regulation of the “shadow banking system”.  
In response, the FSB released a report on 27 October 20111 on strengthening oversight and 
regulation of shadow banking.  
 
Building on this report and on the invitation of the November 2011 G20 Cannes Summit to 
develop its work further, the FSB has also initiated five work-streams tasked with analysing 
the issues in more detail and developing effective policy recommendations. These work-
streams include: (i) the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) will work on how 
to further regulate the interaction between banks and shadow banking entities and report in 
July 2012; (ii) the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) will work 
on regulation to mitigate the systemic risks (including run-type risks) of Money Market Funds 
(MMFs) and report in July 2012; (iii) IOSCO, with the help of the BCBS, will carry out an 
evaluation of existing securitisation requirements and make further policy recommendations 
in July 2012; (iv) a FSB subgroup will examine the regulation of other shadow banking 
entities2 and report in September 2012; and, (v) another FSB subgroup will work on securities 
lending and repos and report in December 2012. These work-streams bring together the EU 
and other major jurisdictions including the US, China and Japan, who are each considering 
appropriate regulatory measures. 
3.  WHAT IS SHADOW BANKING? 
 
The October 2011 FSB report represents the first comprehensive international effort to deal 
with shadow banking. It focuses on (i) the definition of principles for the monitoring and 
regulation of the shadow banking system; (ii) the initiation of a mapping process to identify 
and assess systemic risks involved in shadow banking; and, (iii) the identification of the scope 
of possible regulatory measures.  
 
In this report, the FSB defined the shadow banking system as "the system of credit 
intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system". This 
definition implies the shadow banking system is based on two intertwined pillars.  
 
First, entities operating outside the regular banking system engaged in one of the following 
activities:  
• accepting funding with deposit-like characteristics;  
• performing maturity and/or liquidity transformation;  
• undergoing credit risk transfer; and,  
• using direct or indirect financial leverage.  
Second, activities that could act as important sources of funding of non-bank entities. These 
activities include securitisation, securities lending and repurchase transactions ("repo"). 
 
                                                            
1 Available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111027a.pdf  
2 Other shadow banking entities covers the entities listed in the box below, excluding MMFs. 
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Against this background, the Commission is at this stage focussing its analysis on the 
following possible shadow banking entities and activities. This should not be viewed as 
exhaustive, as shadow banking entities and activities can evolve very rapidly. 
 
Possible shadow banking entities and activities on which the Commission is currently 
focussing its analysis 
Entities: 
-  Special purpose entities which perform liquidity and/or maturity transformation; for 
example, securitization vehicles such as ABCP conduits, Special Investment Vehicles 
(SIV) and other Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV); 
-  Money Market Funds (MMFs) and other types of investment funds or products with 
deposit-like characteristics, which make them vulnerable to massive redemptions ("runs"); 
-  Investment funds, including Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), that provide credit or are 
leveraged; 
-  Finance companies and securities entities providing credit or credit guarantees, or 
performing liquidity and/or maturity transformation without being regulated like a bank; 
and 
-  Insurance and reinsurance undertakings which issue or guarantee credit products.  
 
Activities: 
-  Securitisation; and 
-  Securities lending and repo. 
 
 
The FSB has roughly estimated the size of the global shadow banking system at around € 46 
trillion in 2010, having grown from € 21 trillion in 2002. This represents 25-30% of the total 
financial system and half the size of bank assets. In the United States, this proportion is even 
more significant, with an estimated figure of between 35% and 40%. However, according to 
the FSB estimates, the share of the assets of financial intermediaries other than banks located 
in Europe as a percentage of the global size of shadow banking system has strongly increased 
from 2005 to 2010, while the share of US located assets has decreased. On a global scale, the 
share of those assets held by European jurisdictions has increased from 10 to 13% for UK 
intermediaries, from 6 to 8% for NL intermediaries, from 4% to 5% for DE intermediaries and 
from 2% to 3% for ES intermediaries. FR and IT intermediaries maintained their previous 
shares in the global shadow banks assets of 6% and 2% respectively. 
 
 5 
 
 
Questions: 
 
a)  Do you agree with the proposed definition of shadow banking? 
 
b)  Do you agree with the preliminary list of shadow banking entities and activities? Should 
more entities and/or activities be analysed? If so, which ones? 
 
4.  WHAT ARE THE RISKS AND BENEFITS RELATED TO SHADOW BANKING? 
 
Shadow banking activities can constitute a useful part of the financial system, since they 
perform one of the following functions: (i) they provide alternatives for investors to bank 
deposits; (ii) they channel resources towards specific needs more efficiently due to increased 
specialization; (iii) they constitute alternative funding for the real economy, which is 
particularly useful when traditional banking or market channels become temporarily impaired; 
and, (iv) they constitute a possible source of risk diversification away from the banking 
system. 
 
Shadow banking entities and activities may however also create a number of risks.  Some of 
these risks can be of a systemic nature, in particular due to the complexity of shadow banking 
entities and activities; their cross-jurisdictional reach and the inherent mobility of securities 
and fund markets; and, the interconnectedness of shadow banking entities and activities with 
the regular banking system. 
 
These risks can be grouped together as follows: 
 
(i) Deposit-like funding structures may lead to "runs": 
Shadow banking activities are exposed to similar financial risks as banks, without being 
subject to comparable constraints imposed by banking regulation and supervision. For 
example, certain shadow banking activities are financed by short-term funding, which is 
prone to risks of sudden and massive withdrawals of funds by clients. 
 (ii) Build-up of high, hidden leverage: 
High leverage can increase the fragility of the financial sector and be a source of systemic 
risk. Shadow banking activities can be highly leveraged with collateral funding being churned 
several times, without being subject to the limits imposed by regulation and supervision.  
(iii) Circumvention of rules and regulatory arbitrage:  
Shadow banking operations can be used to avoid regulation or supervision applied to regular 
banks by breaking the traditional credit intermediation process in legally independent 
structures dealing with each other. This "regulatory fragmentation" creates the risk of a 
regulatory "race to the bottom" for the financial system as a whole, as banks and other 
financial intermediaries try to mimic shadow banking entities or push certain operations into 
entities outside the scope of their consolidation.  For example, operations circumventing 
capital and accounting rules and transferring risks outside the scope of banking supervision 
played an important role in the build-up to the 2007/2008 crisis. 
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(iv) Disorderly failures affecting the banking system: 
Shadow banking activities are often closely linked to the regular banking sector. Any failures 
can lead to important contagion and spill-over effects. Under distress or severe uncertainty 
conditions, risks taken by shadow banks can easily be transmitted to the banking sector 
through several channels: (a) direct borrowing from the banking system and banking 
contingent liabilities (credit enhancements and liquidity lines); and, (b) massive sales of assets 
with repercussions on prices of financial and real assets.   
 
 
Questions: 
 
c)  Do you agree that shadow banking can contribute positively to the financial system?  
Are there other beneficial aspects from these activities that should be retained and 
promoted in the future? 
 
d)  Do you agree with the description of channels through which shadow banking activities 
are creating new risks or transferring them to other parts of the financial system? 
 
e)  Should other channels be considered through which shadow banking activities are 
creating new risks or transferring them to other parts of the financial system? 
 
5.  WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES FOR SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY AUTHORITIES? 
 
Given the potential risks set out above, it is essential that supervisory and regulatory 
authorities consider how best to address shadow banking entities and activities. However, this 
task presents various challenges. 
 
First, the authorities concerned have to identify and monitor the relevant entities and their 
activities. In the EU, most national authorities have relevant experience and the European 
Central Bank (ECB), the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority 
(EIOPA) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) have started building up expertise 
on shadow banking. However, there remains a pressing need to fill the current data gaps on 
the interconnectedness between banks and non-banks financial institutions on a global basis. 
The EU could therefore need to ensure  permanent processes for the collection and exchange 
of information on identification and supervisory practices between all EU supervisors, the 
Commission, the ECB and other central banks. This will require close coordination among 
them to share information and promptly detect problems. It may also require new specific 
powers for national supervisory authorities.  
 
Secondly, the authorities have to determine the approach to supervising shadow banking 
entities. The Commission considers it should (i) be performed at the appropriate level, i.e. 
national and/or European; (ii) be proportionate; (iii) take into account existing supervisory 
capacity and expertise; and, (iv) be integrated with the macro-prudential framework. On the 
latter, the authorities must be able to understand the hidden credit intermediation chains; 
assess properly their systemic importance; consider the macro-prudential implications of new 
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products or activities; and, map the interconnectedness of the shadow banking system with the 
rest of the financial sector.  
 
Thirdly, as shadow banking issues may require extending the scope and nature of prudential 
regulation, appropriate regulatory responses are needed. The afore-mentioned FSB report has 
suggested some general principles which regulators should apply in designing and 
implementing regulatory measures for shadow banking. The FSB suggested that regulatory 
measures should be targeted, proportionate, forward-looking and adaptable, effective, and 
should be subject to assessment and review. The Commission considers that the authorities 
should take into account these high-level principles. The Commission also considers that a 
specific approach to each kind of entity and/or activity must be adopted. This will require 
achieving the right balance between three possible and complementary means: (i) indirect 
regulation (regulating the links between the banking system and shadow banking entities); (ii) 
appropriate extension or revision of existing regulation; and, (iii) new regulation specifically 
directed at shadow banking entities and activities. In this context, alternative or 
complementary non-regulatory measures also need to be considered. 
 
Questions: 
 
f)  Do you agree with the need for stricter monitoring and regulation of shadow banking 
entities and activities? 
 
g)  Do you agree with the suggestions regarding identification and monitoring of the 
relevant entities and their activities? Do you think that the EU needs permanent 
processes for the collection and exchange of information on identification and 
supervisory practices between all EU supervisors, the Commission, the ECB and other 
central banks? 
 
h)  Do you agree with the general principles for the supervision of shadow banking set out 
above?  
 
i)  Do you agree with the general principles for regulatory responses set out above? 
 
j)  What measures could be envisaged to ensure international consistency in the treatment 
of shadow banking and avoid global regulatory arbitrage? 
 
6.  WHAT REGULATORY MEASURES APPLY TO SHADOW BANKING IN THE EU? 
 
In the EU, each of the three possible regulatory approaches outlined in the previous section of 
this Green Paper is currently being followed and is summarised below. A number of 
legislative proposals with implications for shadow banking entities and activities are already 
in place or currently being negotiated by the European Parliament and the Council. Some 
Member States also have additional national rules for the oversight of financial entities and 
activities that are not regulated at EU level.  
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6.1. Indirect regulation of shadow banking activities through banking and insurance 
regulation 
The EU has taken important steps indirectly to address shadow banking issues raised by 
securitisation structures to deter banks to circumvent existing capital requirements and other 
legislation: 
• the revision of the EU banking capital requirements directive in 2009 (the so-called 
Capital Requirements Directive, or "CRD II"),3 which Member States should have 
transposed into national law by October 2010, required both originators and 
sponsors of securitized assets to retain a substantial share of their underwritten 
risks. The directive also reinforced the treatment of liquidity lines and credit 
exposure to securitization vehicles. The previous rules had allowed banks to avoid 
posting capital for the corresponding risks; 
• the amendments in the subsequent revision of the directive in 2010 (the so-called 
"CRD III")4 further strengthened capital requirements in line with the 
recommendations published by the BCBS in July 2009. Since December 2011, 
banks have been required to comply with additional disclosure rules and hold 
significantly more capital to cover their risks when investing in complex re-
securitisations. This Directive also required competent authorities in all Member 
States, when carrying out their risk assessment of individual banks under Pillar 2 of 
the Basel/CRD framework, to take into account reputational risks arising from 
complex securitisation structures or products;5  
• in its proposal for the latest revision to the directive (the so-called "CRD IV")6 the 
Commission has proposed the introduction of explicit liquidity requirements as of 
2015, including liquidity facilities for SPVs and for any other products or services 
linked to a bank's reputational risk; and  
• the Commission endorsed in November 2011 an amendment to the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to improve the disclosure requirements 
relating to the transfer of financial assets (related to IFRS 7).7 The Commission is 
also analysing the new standards on consolidation (related to IFRS 10, 11 and 12). 
The objective of these standards is to improve the consolidation of securitization 
vehicles and the disclosure requirements relating to unconsolidated participations in 
"structured entities" like securitisation vehicles or asset-backed financing. 
 
                                                            
3 Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 amending 
Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain 
own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management, OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 
97–119. 
4 Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-
securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies, OJ L 329, 14.12.2010, p. 3–35. 
5 See Annex V, point 8 of Directive 2006/48/EC as amended by Directive 2009/111/EC. 
6 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/index_en.htm 
7 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1205/2011 of 22 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 
adopting certain international accounting standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7 Text 
with EEA relevance. 
 9 
 
 
With regard to the insurance sector, under the rules implementing the Solvency II Framework 
Directive8 (Solvency II) for insurance and reinsurance undertakings investing in securitisation 
products, the Commission plans to require originators and sponsors of such products to meet 
risk retention requirements similar to those set out in banking legislation.  
 
6.2. Enlarging the scope of current prudential regulation to shadow banking activities 
The scope of existing regulations has also been extended to new entities and activities so as to 
have a broader coverage, address systemic risk concerns and make future regulatory arbitrage 
more difficult. 
 
This is the approach taken as regards investment firms. They are subject to the regime set out 
in the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).9 In the review of this framework, 
the Commission proposed on 20 October 2011 a recast directive and a regulation in order to 
broaden the scope of the framework (e.g. to cover all high frequency traders and more 
commodity investment firms will be brought within the scope of MiFID); increase the 
transparency of non-equity instruments – which will enhance the ability to identify risks from 
shadow banking; and, entrust competent national authorities and ESMA with enhanced and 
proactive intervention powers, enabling them to control and mitigate risks from shadow 
banking. MiFID does not directly impose capital requirements for those firms brought within 
its scope. However, it cross-refers to the Capital Requirements Directive, thereby imposing 
bank-like prudential regulation on entities performing shadow banking activities. 
 
6.3. Direct regulation of some shadow banking activities 
Finally, the EU has also already adopted measures to regulate shadow banking entities and 
activities directly. 
 
As far as investment funds are concerned, the Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive (AIFMD)10 already addresses a number of shadow banking issues, provided that the 
entities concerned are captured as alternative investment funds under that directive. Asset 
managers are now required to monitor liquidity risks and employ a liquidity management 
system. Given new methods for calculating the leverage and reporting requirements, activities 
such as repurchase agreements or securities lending will be easier for the competent 
authorities to monitor.  
 
As regards MMFs and ETFs, these funds may be covered by existing legislation on 
undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS).11 In addition, 
                                                            
8 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up 
and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance, OJ L335/1 of 17.12.2009. 
9  Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial 
instruments,  OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1–44. 
10 Directive 2011/61/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 
1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, OJ L 174, 1.7.2011, p.1. 
11  Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable 
securities,  
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ESMA has developed guidelines which entered into force on 1 July 2011.12 These guidelines 
include recommendations for these funds to restrict the eligible investments, limit the 
weighted-average maturity, and to carry out daily net asset value calculations. 
 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) are not leveraged and they do not directly engage in maturity 
transformation. Nevertheless, they have an important role in the credit intermediation chain 
since they assign ratings to products and entities. In the EU, CRAs are subject to stringent 
regulation and supervision by ESMA.13 Moreover, the Commission has proposed additional 
legislative measures to strengthen the credit rating process.14 
 
Finally, in relation to insurance regulation, Solvency II also addresses a number of shadow 
banking issues as it provides comprehensive regulation centred on a risk-based and economic 
approach, along with strong risk management requirements including a "prudent person" 
principle for investments. In particular, it explicitly covers credit risks in capital requirements; 
provides for a total balance sheet approach where all entities and exposures are subject to 
group supervision; and, is as stringent in respect of credit risk as CRD IV. Solvency II also 
requires Member States to authorise the establishment of an insurance SPV. Detailed rules 
implementing Solvency II which are currently being considered will include authorisation and 
ongoing regulatory requirements relating to solvency, governance and reporting as far as 
insurance SPVs are concerned.  
 
Questions: 
 
k)  What are your views on the current measures already taken at the EU level to deal with 
shadow banking issues? 
 
7. OUTSTANDING ISSUES  
 
Although the indirect, extended and direct regulatory measures set out above go a long way to 
addressing shadow banking entities and activities, there is still further progress to make given 
the evolving nature of the shadow banking system and out understanding of it. 
 
In coordination with the FSB, the standards setting bodies and the relevant EU supervisory 
and regulatory authorities, the aim of the Commission's current work is to examine existing 
measures carefully and to propose an appropriate approach to ensure comprehensive 
supervision of the shadow banking system, coupled with an adequate regulatory framework.  
 
                                                            
12 Available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/content/Guidelines-Common-definition-European-money-market-
funds  
13 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit 
rating agencies, OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 1–31, and Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 May 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, OJ L 
145, 31.5.2011, p. 30–56. 
14 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, COM(2011) 747 final of 15.11.2011. 
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In this context, there are five key areas where the Commission is further investigating options 
and next steps. 
 
7.1. Banking Regulation  
In this area, several issues are being examined with the overarching aim to:  
• recapture for prudential purposes any flawed risk transfer towards shadow banking 
entities;  
• examine ways to identify the channels of exposures, limit excessive exposure to 
shadow banking entities and improve the disclosure requirements of banks towards 
exposures to such entities; and 
• ensure that banking regulation covers all relevant activities. 
 
In particular, consolidation rules for shadow banking entities are being examined to ensure 
that bank-sponsored entities are appropriately consolidated for prudential purposes and 
therefore fully subject to the comprehensive Basel III framework. It is also appropriate to 
study the differences between accounting consolidation and prudential consolidation, as well 
as the differences between jurisdictions. In this regard, it is worthwhile to assess the impact of 
the new IFRS on consolidation, in particular in respect of shadow banking entities. 
 
As regards bank exposure to shadow banking entities, there are several issues that need to be 
investigated further: (i) whether the large exposure regime in the current banking legislation is 
stringent enough to properly  address all shadow banking exposures, individually as well as 
globally; (ii) how to account effectively for leverage in shadow banking entities such as 
investment funds, including in particular whether to extend the so-called look-through 
approach currently being applied by some banks; (iii) whether to apply the CRD II treatment 
of liquidity lines and credit exposures for securitisation vehicles to all other shadow banking 
entities; and, (iv) a review of the implementation of the national supervisory treatment for 
implicit support. 
 
Existing EU banking legislation is limited to deposit-taking institutions that provide credit. It 
could be considered to enlarge the scope of financial institutions and activities covered by the 
current legislation. The Commission is currently studying the merits of extending certain 
provisions of CRD IV to non deposit-taking finance companies not covered by the definition 
in the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR).15 This would also limit the scope for future 
regulatory arbitrage for providers of credits.  
 
7.2. Asset management regulation issues 
The Commission is looking carefully at the evolution of both the ETF and the MMF markets 
in the context of shadow banking.  
 
As far as ETFs are concerned, the FSB has identified a possible mismatch between liquidity 
offered to ETF investors and less-liquid underlying assets. The current regulatory debate 
                                                            
15 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, COM(2011) 452 final of 20 July 2011. 
 12 
 
focuses on possible liquidity disruptions; the quality of collateral provided in cases of 
securities lending and derivatives (swap) transactions between ETF providers and their 
counterparties; and, conflicts of interest where counterparties in these transactions belong to 
the same corporate group. Some of these issues are not confined to ETFs. They arise in every 
instance where securities owned by an investment fund are lent to other counterparties or 
where a fund enters into a derivative transaction (e.g. total return swaps) with counterparty. 
 
In addition, ESMA is currently carrying out a review of the UCITS framework in general and 
in particular as regards the potential application to ETFs, with a view to adopting new 
guidelines this year. The guidelines will include recommendations regarding the labelling of 
ETFs, disclosures to investors and use of collateral. 
 
In relation to MMFs, the main concerns identified relate to the risks of runs (i.e. massive 
simultaneous redemptions by investors). Such runs could seriously affect financial stability. 
The FSB has identified the possibility of runs stemming mainly from the credit and liquidity 
risks inherent to the portfolio of an MMF, as well as from the method of valuing MMFs' 
assets. The risks of runs increase when MMFs value their assets through the amortised cost 
approach in order to maintain a stable Net Asset Value (NAV), even if the market values of 
the underlying investments fluctuate, as is the case for the so called constant NAV MMF. 
Investors have an incentive to be the first to withdraw funds from them in time of market 
stress before the NAV is forced to drop.  
 
7.3. Securities lending and repurchase agreements 
Another central issue concerns securities lending and repurchase agreements as these 
activities can be used rapidly to increase leverage and are a key source of funds used by some 
shadow banking entities. The ongoing work by the Commission and the FSB is examining 
current practices, identifying regulatory gaps in existing regulation and looking at 
inconsistency between jurisdictions. 
  
The specific issues to be covered could include: prudent collateral management; reinvestment 
practises of cash received against collateralised securities; re-use of collateral (re-
hypothecation); ways to improve transparency both in the markets and for supervisory 
authorities, and, the role of market infrastructure. The Commission considers that special 
attention should be given to global leverage resulting from securities lending, collateral 
management and repos transactions in order to ensure that supervisors have accurate 
information to assess this leverage, the tools to control it and to avoid its excessive pro-
cyclical effects. Finally, bankruptcy laws and their impact on collateral should also be 
reviewed with a view to increasing international consistency along with the accounting 
practices of such transactions.  
 
7.4. Securitisation 
It will be important to include an examination of whether the measures relating to 
securitisation set out earlier in this Green Paper have been effective in addressing shadow 
banking concerns.  
 
In addition, the Commission is currently examining how similar measures can be taken in 
other sectors. The main issues include transparency, standardisation, retention and accounting 
requirements. The Commission services and the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
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have therefore started comparing securitisation rules in the EU and in the US which share the 
goal of safer and sounder securitisation practices. Joint work has also been launched within 
IOSCO, in coordination with the BCBS, to help the FSB in developing policy 
recommendations by July 2012 aimed at requesting all jurisdictions to adopt comparable and 
compatible frameworks. 
 
7.5. Other shadow banking entities16 
Additional work on other shadow banking entities is also underway within the FSB and the 
EU in order to: (i) list the entities that could be covered; (ii) map the existing regulatory and 
supervisory regimes in place; (iii) identify gaps in these regimes; and, (iv) suggest additional 
prudential measures for these entities, where necessary.  
 
Data collection is another issue to consider, as some national supervisors may not have the 
necessary powers to collect data on all shadow banking entities. The Commission and the 
European Supervisory Authorities will consult with national supervisory authorities in order 
to assess the situation. Depending on the results, a legislative approach at EU level could be 
warranted. In line with the FSB's work on data gaps, it may also be useful to ensure that 
supervisors have the powers to collect and share data on a global basis. In this context, the 
creation of a global Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) would be welcome.17  
 
As stated in its Green Paper of 20 October 2010,18 the Commission will also undertake further 
work on the resolution of other financial institutions. This will examine the nature of the risks 
for financial stability posed by various non-bank entities and explore the need for any 
appropriate resolution arrangements. In this context, a number of the shadow bank entities 
referred to in this Green Paper will be considered.  
 
Finally, the Commission considers that further analysis should be carried out to monitor 
whether the new Solvency II Framework will be fully effective in addressing any issues raised 
by insurance and reinsurance undertakings performing activities similar to shadow banking 
activities. 
 
Questions:  
 
l)  Do you agree with the analysis of the issues currently covered by the five key areas 
where the Commission is further investigating options? 
 
m)  Are there additional issues that should be covered? If so, which ones? 
 
n)  What modifications to the current EU regulatory framework, if any, would be necessary 
properly to address the risks and issues outlined above? 
 
                                                            
16 For a list of other shadow banking entities, see foot note 2.  
17 The LEI is a global standard that would help risk management, data quality and macro prudential supervision. 
The FSB has set up an Expert Group to coordinate work among the global regulatory community to prepare 
recommendations for the appropriate governance framework for a global LEI. 
18 Available at  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/crisis-
management/framework/com2010_579_en.pdf 
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o)  What other measures, such as increased monitoring or non-binding measures should be 
considered? 
 
8. WHAT ARE THE NEXT STEPS ENVISAGED BY THE EU? 
 
On the basis of the outcome of this consultation and the work carried out by the ESRB, EBA, 
ESMA and EIOPA, the Commission will decide on the appropriate follow-up regarding the 
shadow banking issues outlined in this Green Paper, including legislative measures, as 
appropriate. The Commission will continue to engage in ongoing international work, 
including to ensure any level playing field concerns are addressed. Any regulatory follow-up 
will be accompanied by a careful assessment of its potential impacts and will also take into 
account the results of the work of the high-level expert group on structural banking reforms 
recently appointed by the Commission.19 After the publication of the group's report, the 
Commission will assess the need for additional, targeted consultations on selected issues, as 
necessary.  
 
The Commission invites stakeholders to comment on all the issues set out in this Green Paper 
and in particular to respond to the questions above. In addition, the Commission is organising 
a public conference on shadow banking in Brussels on 27 April 2012 to which all 
stakeholders are invited.20 
 
The responses received will be available in the Commission website unless confidentiality is 
specifically requested, and the Commission will publish a summary of the results of the 
consultation. 
 
Stakeholders are invited to send their comments before 1 June 2012 to the following email 
address: markt-consultation-shadow-banking@ec.europa.eu 
 
 
                                                            
19 http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/barnier/headlines/news/2012/01/20120116_en.htm  
20 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/shadow_banking/index_en.htm  
